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The focus of this paper is the theoretical arbitrage relationship between the Credit 
Default Swaps and Corporate Bonds. We find that the arbitrage relationship tends to be 
violated, creating short term opportunities for traders. Results of VECM suggest that the 
difference in price of credit risk persists over time. This violation is explained by three 
sets of factors: 1) firm-specific credit risk proxies, 2) bond and CDS liquidity and 3) 
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Credit Default Swap is an exciting innovation in financial markets, which has grown 
rapidly over the past decade. Since its beginning in early 1990s
1
, the CDS market has 
grown to $58,2 Trillion in 2007, falling to $24,5 trillion in early 2013 according to the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). 
Figure 1. CDS Market Total Volume Evolution (USD, Trillion) 
 
However, it is still a big market, equal to around 40% of total world market cap and 
around 30% of world GDP.
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This paper analyzes the empirical relationship between CDS contracts and 
corresponding corporate bonds for a sample of 98 US companies covering the period 
from May 31, 2002 to October 22, 2013. Those two financial instruments are linked 
together with an arbitrage relationship. A portfolio consisting of a corporate bond and 
the respective CDS contract on it is theoretically default-risk free. In case of default the 
CDS payout should cover for all the losses of the investor; thus the yield of the portfolio 
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should be equal to risk-free rate. In our sample we find that there are differences in the 
prices on bond and CDS markets. Credit Default Swap premiums for the US companies 
are on average higher than the spreads of corporate bonds over the risk-free benchmark, 
suggesting violations of the arbitrage relationship. The difference between CDS 
premium and bond spread is called basis, which may take any sign. It is positive when 
CDS premium is larger than the bond spread and negative otherwise. 
There are a few papers about this in the literature. Longstaff et al. (2005) estimate the 
basis for a set of 68 US entities and they show that there is a significant violation of the 
arbitrage relationship resulting in positive basis. Norden and Weber (2004), with a set of 
58 US and Non-US entities show that the basis is persistent during the period of 2000 to 
2002 and positive on average. 
De Wit (2006) shows that there is a non-zero basis in the short run for 103 entities with 
Euro denominated contracts. However, studying the long run relationship finds that on 
average from 2004 to 2005 the arbitrage relationship holds reasonably well, converging 
the basis to zero in the long run. Levin et al. (2005) for a larger sample of 306 US 
entities show that the average basis is not significantly different from zero, confirming 
the non-arbitrage.  
First, our findings suggest that for the 98 US companies the basis is different from zero 
in the cross section. We also find that financial and speculative graded companies are 
exposed to larger basis and have bigger standard deviation. The differentiation between 
investment and speculative grade companies is obvious due to the fact, that low rated 
companies have larger spreads so the behavior should be different. The idea of 
differentiating between financial and nonfinancial is caused by the fact that financial 
companies are major counterparties on the CDS market. Acharya and Johnson (2007) 
show evidence of informed trading of banks in CDS market, due to this fact the CDS 
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premium is expected to behave differently causing different basis. Due to our large 
sample, we are also able to study the behavior of the basis during the financial crisis of 
2007 - 2009.
3
 Fontana (2009) explores the behavior of the basis during financial crisis. 
He shows that the basis was negative for the sample of 37 companies that he analyzed. 
Our sample allows us to study the behavior of the basis before, during and after this 
financial crisis. We confirm that, on average, the basis is negative during this financial 
crisis.  
Second, we study if the mispricing persists over time. Using cointegration tests, we 
study the long-term relationship between CDS premium and Asset Swap Spread. We 
use the Johansen Cointegration test for a vector error correction model (VECM), like 
Trapp (2009), Blanco et al. (2005), Norden and Weber (2004), Hull et al. (2004). With 
the estimated values we explain which market, if there is cointegration, is the first one 
to discover the changes in the credit risk.
4
 Our findings suggest that before and after 
financial crisis Credit Default Swaps are the first to price the changes in the credit risk 
and spilling over the information to the corporate bond market, while during financial 
crisis we obtain mixed evidence. Another interesting finding is that the US financial 
companies are exposed to weaker cointegrating relationship than non-financial, 
suggesting that other factors, rather than default risk have more impact for this 
subsample. 
Third, we study the determinants of non-zero basis. There are three broad reasons: 
issuer credit risk, liquidity, other market related variables. Increase in issuer credit risk 
increases uncertainty about its future, which is followed by higher volatility of the 
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 See National Bureau of Economic Research definition of Financial Crisis in the world 
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 Blanco et al. (2005) shows that 26 out of 33 companies are cointegrated, CDS tends to lead bonds, 
Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) obtain mixed results in terms of lead lag relationship with 5 out of 8 
companies showing cointegration, Norden and Weber (2004) state that for 36 out of 58 cointegrated time 
series CDS lead bonds, Zhu (2004) with 15 cointegrated out of 24 time-series show that CDS lead bonds 
only in the US. 
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respective assets, increasing the Asset Swap Spreads. We check which market is the one 
to be more exposed to effects transferred from the issuer specific credit risk changes. 
The second reason is important because it is a well known fact that liquidity of any 
financial instrument has direct impact on its value. We extend analysis of Longstaff et 
al. (2005) and Tang and Yan (2007) suggesting that CDS and Bond market liquidity 
both significantly impact the basis. As a third reason we study are the aggregate market 
conditions and their effect on the basis. Contrasting to Zhu (2004) whose focus is on 
stock market and interest rate level, we find that slope of the rate curve and overall 
market liquidity have significant impact on the basis, but risk free rate has impact only 
for subsamples of speculative grade rated companies.  
 
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 CDS 
Credit Default Swap premium is the cost per annum for protection against a default by 
the company [Hull et al., 2004]. Buyer buys protection from contract seller against the 
credit event (which is default) and agrees to pay a certain cost - Credit Default Swap 
premium - to the seller until the maturity of the contract or until the credit event occurs. 
In case of the credit event, the seller has to pay the buyer the face value of the contract 
deducted the recovery rate.
5
 Hence, CDS has two components - fixed and floating 
(contingent). Fixed leg is the present value of all the payments that will be made to the 
protection seller: 
                  
    
      
 
       (1) 
where Z is the spread charged by the seller, NP is the face value of the contract, and R is 
a risk free rate. Basically it is the sum of present values of all payments made to the 
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protection seller by protection buyer. The floating (contingent) leg is the present value 
of the payment that will be made if the credit event occurs: 
                     
           
      
 
      (2) 
where RR is the recovery rate, NP is the face value,    is the probability of default. In 
case of the credit event the seller will basically have to pay the NP (face value) minus 
the recovery rate, which is indicated in (1-RR). 
 
2.2 Asset Swap Spreads 
Like CDS premium, bond spreads over a risk-free benchmark mainly compensate 
investors for default risk embedded in credit-risk assets [De Wit, 2006]. So, there is a 
clear theoretical link between CDS premium and bond yield spreads for floating rate par 
bonds, if the two quantities are viewed as a pure measure of credit risk [Duffie, 1999]. 
Instead of floating rate par bonds, fixed coupon bonds with a use of a fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swap can be used [Duffie, 1999]. If there is a violation and the difference in 
pricing of credit risk appears - it is called the basis. Basis is the difference between the 
CDS premium and the Bond spread over the benchmark. Putting it simply it is the 
difference in price of the credit risk between CDS market and Cash-Bond market 
[Choudhry, 2006]. 
A bond has three types of risk: the credit, interest rate and funding. Two of those risks 
can be eliminated simply by swapping the bond and making its coupons variable [JP 
Morgan, 2010]. As Duffie (1999) states, the best way is to use floating rate bonds, but 
in case if they are not available we can synthetically make a floating rate by swapping 
the bond. Basically remaining component is the Asset Swap Spread, which is close to 
the pure credit risk represented in the CDS premium. 
                                    (3) 
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We can also use risk-free rate as a benchmark for estimating the Asset Swap Spread. 
However, Hull et al. (2004) empirically show that Swap Rate works better for this 
matter. 
 
2.3 Relationship between CDS and Asset Swap Spread 
With the two simplifying assumptions, we depict the equivalence relationship. Assume 
a par risk-free bond with a fixed coupon rate R and a risky bond with a fixed coupon C, 
both with face value of USD 100.    is defined as a risk-neutral probability density 
function, such that the probability of survival of the reference entity until t is defined as: 
              
 
 
         (4) 
The fixed CDS premium amounts to Pcds and the payment dates coincide with the 
coupon payments of the bonds until the maturity T or a credit event t. The market value 
of the reference obligation equals Dt at time t. Present value of the premium payments is 
equal to the sum of all the discounted premiums paid during the life of the contract or 
until the default: 
              
 
      (5) 
while the expected value of the insurance payment in case of credit event is: 
     
 
 
                            (6) 
The value of the CDS at the start time has to be equal zero because there are no cash 
payments between the two counterparties. Carrying this in mind, Equations (6) and (7) 
have to be equal: 
              
 
    
    
 
                 (7) 
The present value of the reference bond consists of three parts. First component is the 
present value of all the coupons paid. The final payment of the bond, in case of no 
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default, is the second component [Zhu, 2006]. The last component is the expected 
market value at default. It can be formalized in the following equation: 
                    
    
        
    
 
          (8) 
Investor establishes a long position in the risk-free bond with a face value of 100 USD, 
which he funds by a short position in the risky bond of the same amount. The long 
position coupons are used to make the short position payments. If there is no default, 
both mature at time T and there is no net cash-flow needed. In case of a credit event, the 
long position is liquidated for 100 USD and risky bond is acquired for the market value 
of Dt. Initial payment is zero, no arbitrage condition requires the expected value of the 
payments of the portfolio to be equal zero. Mathematically: 
                   
            
    
 
                      
 
 
                 
 
 
              (9) 
Simplifying the relationship: 
               
 
    
    
 
                 (10) 
subtracting this from the Equation (8), we get: 
                    (11) 
Equation (11) shows that theoretically CDS premium should equal the credit spread (we 
use Asset Swap Spread) of bond yields above the risk-free benchmark. Equation (11) 
can be rewritten as follows: 
                 (12) 
The left side of Equation (12) represents basis spread and should be equal to zero. 
Equation (12) is used to estimate the basis. We use US Swap rate as the risk-free 
benchmark as Hull et al. (2004) empirically prove that it is a better proxy for estimation 




3.1 CDS and Bond Data Set 
We first collect all the available CDS contracts for US Companies from Markit. Our 
focus is the 5 year CDS contracts as the most widely available.
6
 We remove all the CDS 
time series with different from 5 year maturities. This results in 2900 time series of 
CDS contracts with daily observations of the premium. Our next step is to remove all 
the time-series which have less than 1500 observations, as we would like to capture the 
behavior of the premiums before, during and after the Financial Crisis. This results in 
330 time series of daily observation of the CDS premiums. We also extract the 
premiums for the same tickers from Bloomberg to confirm the consistency of the data. 
Our final CDS sample consists of 330 US companies with 5 year CDS contracts having 
observations of the premium from May 31, 2002 to October 22, 2013. 
The second variable of our equation are the bonds. To match the 5 year maturity of the 
CDS contracts we need to find 5-year bond yields of the respective entities. We use 
Bloomberg terminal to obtain a time series of bond yields. As our time-series length is 
close to 11 years and the maturity of the contracts is only 5 years, some of the bonds are 
already matured. Most of the times the corresponding 5 year maturity bonds were not 
available, so we collected bonds with maturity up to 10 years, one bond with maturity 
less than 5 years and one with more than . The obtained yields were then linearly 
interpolated to estimate an artificial 5-year bond yield. To keep the prices comparable, 
only “plain vanilla” bonds were included in the search. This means that all bonds with 
special features, e.g. embedded options, deferred coupons or sinking funds were 
excluded. Bonds are priced and have yields, only if they are traded and bidders submit 
their quotes, this result in a great number of illiquid bonds not having any or having 
very few historical observations on the yields, forcing us to decrease the total estimation 
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 see Bai, Collin-Dufresne (2012), p. 15; Longstaff et al. (2005), p. 2217. 
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sample. After matching bonds with the CDS premiums we were left with 98 entities 
having daily observations of both CDS premiums and Bond yields from May 31, 2002 
to October 22, 2013, which compares well with previous studies, like 68 entities of 
Longstaff et al. (2003), 37 entities of Fontana (2009), 33 entities of Blanco et al. (2005). 
We subdivide the data set into subsets based on: credit ratings: AAA-BBB (Investment 
Grade), BB-CCC (Speculative Grade)
 7
, industry sector: Financial, Non-Financial
8
, 
economic conditions: Before Financial Crisis (05/31/2002 to 06/01/2007), Financial 
Crisis (06/01/2007 - 06/01/2009), After Financial Crisis (06/01/2009 to 10/22/2013). 
There are 81 companies rated AAA-BBB, 17 rated BB-CCC, 16 Financial and 82 Non-
Financial Companies. Speculative grade (BB-CCC) companies have more volatility, 
bigger CDS premiums and bigger basis, which is represented in Table 1. With financial 
companies we have different expectations, on one hand their assets are supposed to be 
more liquid, on the other hand they are more affected by market fluctuations.  
We explain the breakdown in to different time sets by the fact that during the turmoil, 
basis turned negative, stated by Fontana (2009), however no one has studied it after the 
Financial Crisis, the breakdown allow us to do it. From Table 1 we see that for both 
CDS and ASW the volatility increases for speculative graded and financial companies. 
The CDS premiums are on average higher than ASW for all subsamples except 
Financial, this is caused by more liquidity in both markets for financial than for non-
financial companies. The higher Spreads for Speculative graded companies are 
accompanied by lower liquidity. 
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 Investment grade companies have less volatile bond yields and CDS premiums [Trapp, 2009]. 
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 Longstaff et al. (2005) document that the non-default component of bond yield spreads for financial 
firms is significantly larger than for non-financial firms. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the Data 
The table contains descriptive statistics of each data sample used. Asset Swap Spreads are estimated using 
interpolated 5 year corporate bonds. CDS mid premiums are in basis points per annum for a 5 year CDS 
contracts. Volatility is the option implied volatility of at the money options with 12-month maturity in 
percentage points. Bond liquidity is the standard deviation of all observed bond yields for a given firm on 
a given date in percentage points. CDS liquidity is the bid-ask spread of a 5 year CDS contract for a 
particular entity, measured in basis points. Risk-Free is a 5 year US government bond yield, measured in 
percentage points. Slope is the difference between 10 year and 1 year US government bonds in percentage 
points. Market liquidity is CITIGROUP US Market Liquidity indicator, measured using five different 
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3.2 Company specific factors 
We employ firm's rating and variables derived from traded stocks and stock options as 
company specific measures of credit risk [Trapp, 2009]. First, we use S&P ratings. 
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Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) find that the rating is the major determinant of the CDS 
premium. They show that it explains 40% of their sample and increase to 66% in 
sovereign sub-sample. We obtain S&P credit ratings for the companies in our sample 
from Bloomberg. We consider a dummy variable,   
 , equal to one when there is a 
rating change and zero otherwise. 
However there is evidence that credit ratings are lagged, since the rating agencies claim 
that their ratings are result of a through-the-cycle evaluation, and borrowers’ 
creditworthiness may be reflected in CDS before the rating adjusted. An example 
supporting this concern by Hull et al. (2004) shows that CDS premium anticipates 
rating changes while only reviews for rating downgrades contain information that 
significantly affect the CDS market. More recently, Lehman Brothers was still rated A a 
month prior to its bankruptcy, CDS premiums skyrocketed. Since the previous results 
are mixed, we investigate if there is impact on basis. Together with credit rating change, 
we use option-implied volatility. They may provide more accurate information on 
changes in the firm's specific creditworthiness in short-run. Cremers et al. (2004) and 
Benkert (2004) show that implied volatilities have additional explanatory power in 
excess of the rating. We obtain series of option-implied volatilities from Bloomberg. 
The implied volatilities for European vanilla at-the-money options with 12-month 
maturities are also used by Trapp (2009), because they are most widely available. We 
obtain bid and ask prices from Markit and estimate a bid-ask spread of a CDS and use it 
as a direct liquidity proxy.  
For bonds we follow Houweling et al. (2004) who identify factors which impact bond 
liquidity. They find that among the others the bond yield volatility on a given date is 
12 
 
one of the factors with most explanatory power. 
9
 We expect the Asset Swap Spreads to 
increase with the increase in illiquidity. 
 
3.3 Market wide factors 
In the market wide factors, we identify three, which might affect the basis. First one is 
the slope of the interest rate curve. We expect it to have impact, because it is related to 
the future business conditions, steeper slope of the term structure is considered to be an 
indicator of improving economic activity in the future. Estrela and Mishkin (1995) find 
that yield curve has the most explanatory power, estimating the probability of recession, 
with a decrease in the slope being associated with an increase in probability of the 
recession. Together with that Aunon-Nerin (2002) shows that curve slope has 
significant negative impact on CDS premiums in the US. Duffee (1998) observes the 
decrease in the yield spreads, when the slope of the Treasury curve increases. Therefore 
we introduce the slope of the US risk-free curve as the difference of a 10 year and a 1 
year risk-free. As we have both CDS premiums and Asset Swap Spreads, when 
estimating basis, the impact of the curve is not clear. 
Second factor is the risk-free interest rate, the effect of which is not clear. On one hand, 
the decrease of the interest rate is usually associated with the recession phases in the 
economy, as governments implement monetary policy, decreasing the borrowing costs. 
Together with this the risk in the country is higher, so the CDS premiums and yields 
spreads increase, as happened during the recent financial crisis. On the other hand the 
higher the risk-free the more costly it is to borrow for particular institutions, firms, 
which depend more on short term financing, are exposed to an increase of uncertainty 
around their viability, which is reflected by increase in the CDS premiums and yields 
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 Shulman et al. (1993) and Hong and Warga (2000) show that higher yield volatility is connected with 
higher illiquidity and higher yields. 
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spreads, another mixed, unclear event. We expect to study the effect of the risk-free to 
full extent, as we have the latest financial crisis and after financial crisis subsamples 
when the risk free became historically low in our sample. 
The third factor is the measure of market-wide liquidity, we use CITIGROUP US 
Market Liquidity Index, obtained from Bloomberg, which is estimated using 5 different 
parameters, which represent liquidity conditions, on a daily basis. Market-Wide factors 




If the arbitrage relationship holds, pricing of credit risk with CDS and Asset Swaps 
should be the same, this should result in equal CDS premiums and Asset Swaps spreads 
for all the entities in the sample. We use Equation (12) from estimate the basis. Results 
are represented in Figure 2. 





















From Figure 1 we see that from 2002 to mid 2007 the average basis for US companies 
was mostly positive, this confirms with the previous research of Norden and Weber 
(2004), Hull et al. (2004), Longstaff et al. (2004). During the financial crisis basis turns 
negative, indicating that Asset Swap Spreads were higher than CDS premiums, which 
we explain by the fact that the bond market was affected by the liquidity problems, 
increase in risk and decrease in risk-free (made by the government to boost the 
economy). To get a more detailed overview we look at the subsample results presented 
in Table 2. 
Table 2. Basis for 98 US companies 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of average basis. The basis is estimated with Equation (11), and 
presented in basis points. First row shows the number of companies in each period of time, last row 
shows the number of observations of the basis. 
   
Time period 
 
Credit Ratings Industry All 
 
  AAA-BBB BB-CC Financial Non-Financial 
 
Whole Sample # of companies 81 17 16 82 98 
(05/31/2002 - 10/22/2013) Mean 2,3 8,0 16,9 1,4 3,4 
 
Std. Deviation 55,7 114,4 83,0 61,7 61,7 
 
Maximum 123,9 345,9 343,2 148,4 175,5 
 
Minimum -331,1 -729,2 -609,8 -371,7 -374,4 
 
# observations 2826 2813 2824 2826 2825 
       
Before Crisis # of companies 81 17 16 82 98 
(05/31/2002-06/01/2007) Mean 15,45 42,87 30,9 26,9 25,9 
 
Std. Deviation 9,31 27,8 30,8 7,7 11,5 
 
Maximum 56,9 294,5 189,1 67,9 64,7 
 
Minimum -57,75 -146,4 -80,7 -54,0 -52,2 
 
# observations 1286 1273 1284 1286 1286 
       
Financial Crisis # of companies 77 14 13 78 91 
(06/01/2007-06/01/2009) Mean -79,5 -118,2 -54,8 -93,1 -85,9 
 
Std. Deviation 95,3 199,4 167,8 104,0 109,2 
 
Maximum 60,7 266,5 343,2 37,2 40,4 
 
Minimum -331,1 -729,2 -609,8 -371,7 -374,4 
 
# observations 439 439 439 439 439 
       
After Crisis # of companies 74 14 12 76 88 
(06/01/2009-10/22/2013) Mean 1,45 50,9 28,2 6,6 9,4 
 
Std. Deviation 33,5 82,9 57,8 35,1 34,4 
 
Maximum 123,9 345,9 231,8 121,3 120,5 
 
Minimum -130,7 -350,7 -217,7 -137,3 -136,3 
  # observations 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 
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Credit rating subgroups show that for the overall sample, as well as for the time period 
subgroups, standard deviation of the basis is growing bigger for companies in the 
speculative grade bucket, this is consistent with the idea that the liquidity of speculative 
grade financial instruments is lower as well as that there is less information on the 
market, as one of the factors to give grades by rating agencies. 
We also see higher standard deviation for financial companies than for non-financial 
companies with bigger mean returns, what is interesting, that during the financial crisis 
the financial companies show average basis less negative than non financial. 
Looking at the overall sample in different time frames, we see that before crisis the 
standard deviation was low at 11,5 with low mean basis of 25,9 which is consistent with 
previous research, during the financial crisis standard deviation increased to 109,2 basis 
point supported by basis becoming negative as stated by Trapp (2009) and Fontana 
(2009), after crisis the standard deviation fell to 34,4 on average with a positive basis of 
9,49 basis points. 
We clearly see, that there is a cross-sectional deviation from the arbitrage relationship, 
which pushes us to the next step, estimating the long-run relationship between Credit 
Default Swap premiums and Asset Swap Spreads. 
 
4.2 Long-Run equilibrium relationship 
We explore the relationship between Asset Swap Spreads and CDS premiums for each 
firm. If credit risk is the only priced factor, we should see a very closed comovement of 
ASW spreads and CDS premiums, theoretically this was explored by Duffie (1999). 
Hull et al. (2004), Blanco et al. (2005), de Wit (2006) documented a positive 
covariance, negative cointegration of yield spreads and CDS premiums. The 
relationship for Asset Swap Spreads should be even tighter. If on one hand we find a 
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significant cointegration we conclude that both markets price credit risk equally in the 
long run, if we don't find the significant cointegration we intuitively ask which factors 
are priced together with the credit risk. 
We proceed with three steps to ensure the VECM is applied correctly, first we apply 
Augumented Dickey-Fuller test on daily data for each company. Both ASW spread and 
CDS premium need to have the same order of integration, if they don't have it, we 
exclude those companies from further estimation process, because the relationship 
between stationary and non-stationary variables is hard to interpret economically. We 
run Johansen Test. The results of the Johansen Test are presented in table 3. 
Table 3. Results of Johansen Test 
This table shows the number of companies 
where the hyphothesis of at least one 
cointegrating vector cannot be rejected and the 
respective P-Value at different lags. 
 
 





















We have considered different lags to capture the cointegration up to weekly level. The 
results make us pick lag 1 as the most appropriate as it has the biggest number of 
companies for both US and Europe and the P-Values are lying within the 5% level. We 
observe for the US only 70% of the sample to be cointegrated which implies that 





To capture the impact of markets we estimate the Vector Error Correction Model as 
following: 
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where     
  is the asset swap spread and     
 is the CDS premium of company k at 
date t.   
  and   
  are the error correction coefficients for the asset swap spread and the 
CDS premium changes.    is the cointegration coefficient and    is the 2x2 coefficient 
matrix for the first differences. 
Table 4. Long-Run Relationship between CDS and Asset Swap Spreads 
This table shows the estimated coefficients of the vector error correction model in Equation (13). β is a 
cointegrating coefficient. α asw and α cds show the error correction terms estimations. Top row presents 
the number of firms for which a) identical order of integration could not be rejected at 10% level, b) 
Johansen test could not reject cointegration of time series at 10% level, c) augumented Dickey-Fuller test 
could reject a unit root in the residuals of the VECM at 10% level. Coefficients are given for premium in 
basis points. 












        















        















        










Std. Dev. 0,007 0,006   0,008 0,007   0,007 
 
Only 72 out of 98 companies show significant cointegration relation between Asset 
Swap Spreads and Credit Default Swap premiums. For the overall sample we may see 
the average cointegration coefficient is equal to -1,83, which points out on the fact that 
Asset Swap Spreads and Credit Default Swap premiums are moving together, the error 
correction coefficient α is larger on average (absolute value) for Asset Swap Spreads 
suggests that they are affected to more extent by long-run relationship deviations, thus 
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credit risk changes are priced first by the Credit Default Swaps. However when we 
consider the standard deviation we conclude that this comovement differs across 
companies, that is why it is interesting to look at sub samples we have, to better 
understand long-run relationships.  
In the Credit Rating subsample the long-run relationship holds better for the investment 
grade subset (on absolute level), the standard deviation once again points at great 
diversity of results between different companies within subsamples. For the speculative 
grade subsample the error correction terms suggest that both Asset Swap Spreads and 
Credit Default Swap premiums react more frequently to deviations from long-run than 
investment grade subset. The price discovery is made as often for bond market as for 
CDS. 
The coefficients are also different, when looking at Financial and Non-Financial 
industry sectors, financial exhibit significant cointegration less frequently, values are 
smaller on average (absolute). Credit Default Swap Premium reacts less frequently to 
the deviations from long-run equilibrium. The link for financials is weaker and more 
asymmetric than for non financial. 
For the total sample, the results imply that price of credit risk can strongly differ 
between Credit Default Swaps and Bonds in the short run and not hold in the long-run. 
Significant comovement is registered only for 72% of the sample. This makes us think 





4.3 Explanatory Regressions 
We have shown with the cointegration analysis that Asset Swap Spreads and CDS 
premiums often evolve independently from one another. Even if there is a significant 
cointegration relation, the often insignificant error correction coefficients imply that 
there are no stable long-run relationships between two time series. Now we explore if 
the independence of two time series is related to time-varying firm-specific and market-
wide risk factors. Results of this test will also allow understanding which conditions 
make cash and synthetic markets converge. 
Equation that we will use is given by: 
      
    
      
        
         
         
         
          
  
       
    
                                                                                                      (14) 
where   
  is a time-invariant firm-specific fixed effect,     
  - S&P Credit Rating 
Change (Dummy Variable),     
  is the option-implied volatility (replaced, if 
unavailable with historical stock return volatility),      
  is the bond market liquidity 
proxy,      
  CDS market liquidity proxy, described before,      
  - 5 year government 
rate level,       
  - government rate slope (difference between 10-year and 1-year), 
     
  - market liquidity index at date t. 
The model is estimated in three steps. Identify the firms, which had at least 20 
observations of basis on days, with all explanatory variables, estimate OLS and 
determine significance with Newey-West test to adjust for autocorrelation and 




Table 5. Impact of Firm-Specific and Market-Wide Factors 
This table shows coefficient estimates, significance level and adjusted    for the model in Equation (14). 
Dependent variable, estimated with Equation (12). Independent variables are:     
  – dummy variable, 
which indicates credit rating change as 1 or no change as 0 for company k on time t,      
  - proxy for a 
CDS market Liquidity, estimated by the difference between CDS bid and CDS ask in basis points,      
  
– volatility of bond yields as proxy for bond market liquidity,     
  - option implied volatility (replaced by 
historical if unavailable),      
  - 5 year US treasury rate,       
  – slope of yield curve, difference 
between 10 year and 1 year US risk-free,     
  – Citigroup US market liquidity indicator. ***, **, * 
represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level for a t-test using Newey-West errors. Adjusted    is in 
percentage points. The last two rows give number of firms and number of basis observations. 








        
  




     





     





    





     





      





     





        










# Obs. 154.768 23.275   27.949 150.094   178.043 
 
First we analyze the overall sample. Looking at firm-specific factors, all but credit 
ratings have a significant impact at 1%. Credit Ratings decrease the basis with 10% 
significance together with option implied volatility, if there is an increase in the credit 
risk this increases the basis, this can be explained by the fact, that the markets price 
credit risk with a lag, which was suggested before. The impact on CDS premium is 
higher than the one on the ASW spread, this causes the basis increase. Decrease in CDS 
market liquidity increases the basis because when markets become illiquid this pushes 
CDS premium up, at the same time the Asset Swap Spreads do not catch up, the 
opposite happens for the bond market liquidity, lower liquidity increases Asset Swap 
Spreads, decreasing the basis. An increase of CDS market liquidity and decrease of 
bond market liquidity push basis to convergence. 
In market-wide explanatory variables, only slope and overall market liquidity have a 
significant impact on basis, not significant impact of risk-free interest rate supports our 
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idea of selecting swap rate as a benchmark for estimation of the basis. Higher slope of 
the interest rate curve increases the basis, suggesting that overall market credit risk 
indicator increases the difference of pricing between CDS and Asset Swaps. Market 
liquidity proxy suggests that when the illiquidity of the market increases – the basis 
increases as well.  
Comparing the estimation results for investment grade and speculative grade 
companies, we observe that in speculative grade subset credit ratings has a positive 
impact on the basis, increasing it, suggesting that uncertainty around credit risk of the 
company is reflected in the CDS premiums before it is reflected in bonds. Surprising is 
the impact of risk-free rate, as it is only significant for speculative grade companies, 
decreasing the basis. Adjusted    is higher for speculative grade subset, suggesting that 
market-wide and firm-specific factors better explain the divergence of the CDS 
premiums and Asset Swap Spreads. 
Regarding Financial and Non-Financial firms in Table 5, we find that rating is 
significant for the non-financial at 10% and not significant for financial in explanation 
of the basis variation. This is reasonable due to the fact, that financial companies have 
bigger media coverage and more publicly available information, making credit ratings 
impact negligible. Higher    suggests that for financial firms overall market liquidity, 
slope of the interest rate curve bond and CDS market liquidity and option volatility have 
bigger explanatory power.  
As a summary, we find that there is a significant impact of 6 out of 7 explanatory 
variables on the basis. Credit Ratings have significant impact only for 2 out of 4 
subsamples, for speculative graded and non-financial companies. Bonds are more 
sensitive to Credit Ratings than CDS. The effect of option implied volatility is 
significant for all the subsamples and is the opposite, suggesting that the CDS react 
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first, we support this with the idea that option implied volatilities are more sophisticated 
tools, and CDS traders rely on them more, while bond traders rely more on traditional 
credit ratings. Decrease in CDS market liquidity increases the basis, and decrease in 
bond market liquidity drives the basis down. Assumption that CDS markets are 
perfectly liquid does not hold, as liquidity has a significant impact. Adjusted    points 
out that for speculative grade and financial companies, variables have more explanatory 
power. Deterioration in overall market conditions has a significant effect on the basis as 
well. As market liquidity decreases, the difference between ASW and CDS increases. 
With the increase in slope we observe an opposite effect, suggesting that slope increase 
decreases current rates and increases the yields of the bonds. 
 
5 Robustness Tests 
First of all in the robustness checks, we test if the relationship estimated before holds 
during the time of financial turmoil from June 2007 to June 2009, defined by NBER. 
We get the respective subsample out of the initial sample, first thing that we notice the 
number of companies during financial crisis decreases by 10%. Then we start with the 
VECM model to estimate the long-run relationship. It is estimated using the same 
methodology as in Section 4.2. We also conduct the test before and after the financial 
crisis to see if the results are persistent. There might be deviations due to different 
macroeconomic conditions and market conditions. Before the crisis there was a stable 
economy growth supported by high liquidity in both CDS and Bond Markets.
10
 After 
the crisis there is a recovery period, CDS markets are less liquid, risk free rates are 
historically low and the US economy is boosted by quantitative easening conducted by 
the Federal Reserve. The results of VECM are presented in Table 6.  
                                                          
10
 CDS as one of the causes of financial crisis are less traded, which is represented by the Volumes in 
Figure 1. Fixed coupon bonds are less used, more floating rate bonds are issued (Bloomberg) 
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Table 6. Long Run relationship time subsamples 
This table shows the estimated coefficients of the vector error correction model in Equation (13). β is a 
cointegrating coefficient. α asw and cds show the error correction terms estimations. Top row presents the 
number of firms for which a) identical order of integration could not be rejected at 10% level, b) Johansen 
test could not reject cointegration of time series at 10% level, c) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test could 
reject a unit root in the residuals of the VECM at 10% level. Coefficients are given for premium in basis 
points. 













Panel A: Before Crisis May 31, 2002 to July 1, 2013 













































        
 
Panel B: Crisis July 1, 2007 to July 1, 2009 













































        
 
Panel C: After Crisis July 1 , 2009 to October 22, 2013 








































Std. Dev. 0,015 0,011   0,021 0,013   0,015 
 
The results differ from ones, estimated for the overall sample and presented in section 
4.2. Number of companies, for which there is a strong cointegrating relationship 
decreases significantly from 72 out of 98 to 33, this is not a surprise, as it was suggested 
in Table 2, when looking at basis we observe that during financial crisis the basis 
became larger with a much larger standard deviation across the firms giving us a feeling 
24 
 
that the cointegrating relationship is weaker, which is proven by the VECM. From 
section 2 we also know that during the turbulent phase of the market there was a dry up 
of the liquidity, both firm-specific and market-wide factors. The CDS market decreased 
almost twice in volumes during financial crisis, suggesting high illiquidity.  
In Panel A we see that there is a higher cointegrating relationship across all the 
subsamples. This confirms the results of the previous research, conducted for the 
samples before financial crisis.
11
. The lower absolute error correction terms, suggest that 
there were less deviations from long run relationship. Higher frequency of significant 
alphas for ASW together with larger error correction suggests that there is a spillover of 
information from the CDS market to the Bond market. In Panel C we see similar pattern 
as in Panel A, despite the fact, that the cointegrating relationship is smaller and error 
correction is bigger for both ASW and CDS, the spillover effect is persistent, across all 
of the subsamples, the cointegration is stronger for Non-Financial and Investment Grade 
companies.  
So the second part of robustness check is to test, whether the factors, suggested in 
section 4.3 have explanatory power during financial crisis and whether they behave 
similarly. The results of the regression are presented in Table 7. 
 
  
                                                          
11
 See Trapp (2009), Blanco Brennan and Marsh (2005), Norden and Weber (2004), who show that on 
average for their samples 70% show significant cointegrating relationship. 
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Table 7. Impact of Firm-Specific and Market-Wide Factors time subsamples 
This table shows coefficient estimates, significance level and adjusted    for the model in Equation (14). 
Dependent variable, estimated with Equation (12). Independent variables are:     
  – dummy variable, 
which indicates credit rating change as 1 or no change as 0 for company k on time t,      
  - proxy for a 
CDS market Liquidity, estimated by the difference between CDS bid and CDS ask in basis points,      
  
– volatility of bond yields as proxy for bond market liquidity,     
  - option implied volatility (replaced by 
historical if unavailable),      
  - 5 year US treasury rate,       
  – slope of yield curve, difference 
between 10 year and 1 year US risk-free,     
  – Citigroup US market liquidity indicator. ***, **, * 
represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level for a t-test using Newey-West errors. Adjusted    is in 
percentage points. Panel A presents results for the sample before crisis, Panel B during financial crisis, 
Panel C after crisis. 








Panel A: Before Crisis May 31, 2002 to July 1, 2013 
  





     





     





    





     





      





     











Panel B: Crisis July 1, 2007 to July 1, 2009 
          





     





     





    





     





      





     











Panel C: After Crisis July 1 , 2009 to October 22, 2013 
          





     





     





    





     





      





     





        
Adj.    55% 59%   52% 55%   61% 
 
We have a higher adjusted   , suggesting that variables have more explanatory power 
during financial crisis. Interesting is that we observe the change in subsamples, 
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particularly for the financial and speculative graded companies, this shows that those 
companies were more exposed to the impact of those factors. All factors except the 
slope, this is caused by the fact, that investors do not care much about the term structure 
of the overall market risk, and is supported by the fact that risk free rate has significant 
explanatory power during this period. Risk-free rate tightens the basis, if increase is 
observed, as most of the assets become illiquid during turbulent market conditions, the 
increase in risk-free rate decreases the Asset Swap Spread, because it shows more 
confidence to investors about the borrowing costs and amounts of risk on the market. 
Market liquidity also tighten the basis, generally we can say that with the improvements 
in market conditions basis tends to move back to zero. As for Firm-Specific factors, 
both illiquidity in CDS and bond market drive the basis from zero down. Rating change 
gains significant impact for all subsamples except speculative grade, they are more 
exposed to moves in liquidity as the low graded assets are the hardest to sell during the 
crisis times, a slight move in liquidity impacts the basis much more than the backward 
looking credit rating changes. Panel A shows that before the financial crisis, the model 
had less explanatory power, which is supported by the fact that cointegrating 
relationship was stronger resulting in less exposure to the exogenous impacts in both 
markets. Financial companies and speculative graded subsamples are more explained by 
the model. All the impacts are consistent with the overall sample. The same we 
conclude for Panel C. Summarizing all abovementioned the model is robust for different 






The conducted research was aimed at exploration of the variables that affect the 
arbitrage relationship, estimated by Duffie (1999) between Credit Default Swaps and 
Corporate Bonds. 
First we show a cross-sectional violation of the arbitrage relationship, estimating the 
basis as the difference of CDS premium and Asset Swap Spread, widely used by basis 
traders. For the overall sample the basis is positive on average, turning negative during 
financial crisis, due to turbulent market conditions, liquidity problems and interest rate 
manipulations by the government. We show that Investment grade companies are less 
exposed to having significant basis, with lower standard deviation and lower negative 
basis during the financial crisis. The same we see for financial companies, when 
comparing them to non-financial. 
We then proceed with the long-run relationship analysis, estimating the cointegration 
relationship between CDS premiums and Asset Swap Spreads. Only 72 out of 98 
companies show significant cointegration, suggesting that there are time-varying factors 
that drive the basis from the equilibrium. The error correction coefficients suggest that 
Credit Default Swaps are the first to discover the information spilling it over to the 
Bond market. This is supported by the fact that Credit Default Swap market is more 
liquid and it is considered as one of the best proxies, reflecting credit risk of the 
company. Robustness checks on different time periods show that during financial crisis 
the relationship weakens to only 30% of the sample showing significant cointegration, 
mostly present at the investment grade, non-financial companies, which are less affected 
by the contagion of financial markets. However, the results also suggest that 
relationship differs strongly across companies.  
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We study the determinants of the basis. The results suggest that 6 out of 7 explanatory 
variables cause significant effect on the basis. Higher slope of the interest rate curve 
affects both CDS premiums and Asset Swap Spreads, supporting the findings of Aunon-
Nerin (2002), who shows that CDS premium is negatively related to the curve slope and 
Duffie (1998) suggests that there is a decrease in yield spreads, when curve slope 
increases. Risk-Free rate however, does not prove to be significant explanatory variable. 
The overall market liquidity has positive effect on the basis, increasing it when market 
is illiquid, meaning that CDS premiums react first on the liquidity conditions in the 
market. Credit rating changes show significant impact on the Non-Financial companies 
and the speculative grade companies, decreasing the basis, while option implied 
volatility has significant impact for all the sample and across it, increasing the basis, this 
means that option implied volatility is reflected first in CDS premiums, we explain this 
idea by the fact, that CDS contracts are mostly traded by financial institutions, who use 
more sophisticated indicators of risk, such as volatility, while companies and private 
investors rely on credit rating agencies. 
Credit Default Swaps incorporate information about credit risk faster than the bond 
markets, however assumption that CDS markets are perfectly liquid does not hold, as 
liquidity has a significant impact. Adjusted    points out that for speculative grade and 
financial companies, variables have more explanatory power. This supports the fact, that 
they are less cointegrated and more exposed to exogenous factors. 
Firm specific risk and liquidity prevent the violations of arbitrage from turning back to 
equilibrium; together with this overall market conditions also have significant impact. 
Traders, who trade basis convergence have to take this into account to avoid the losses, 
occurred during financial crisis. Basis show similar pattern in terms of long-run 
relationship before and after the financial crisis. Around 70% of the sample is 
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cointegrated in those two subperiods. However during the financial crisis basis gets 
more exposed to the deviations from the cointegrating relationship and impact of 
exogenous firm-specific and market-wide factors.  
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